Este ensaio trata da passagem da noção de um self de representação, forjada na modernidade, a partir de Descartes, para a concepção de uma consciência ecológica, impregnada e situada no espaço e no tempo. A noção de consciência incorporada é objeto de estudos por parte da hermenêutica contemporânea e das ciências cognitivas. Entre os estudiosos desse tema, destacam-se Gallagher, Marcel, Taylor e Hutto, entre outros.

Este artigo defende a necessidade da _sabedoria_ _prática _(_phronesis_) para lidar com os desafios e limites éticos decorrentes dos avanços tecnológicos atualmente. Trata-se de um tipo de racionalidade que se ocupa em deliberar bem sobre os _fins_ das ações humanas e julgar se eles são bons ou maus e, mediante isso, fazer opções por valores_._ Assim, a racionalidade prática diz respeito ao agir humano em sentido pleno, que tem a ver com a esfera do _dever-ser_, _dos valores, do sentido da (...) vida_ e das grandes escolhas existenciais humanas. Para isso, o artigo aborda algumas questões relevantes para o debate em _filosofia da tecnologia_, a saber: a ideia de que a tecnologia não é redutível à ciência aplicada, mas se constitui como um conhecimento específico; a distinção do conceito de técnica e tecnologia; a dimensão política da tecnologia; e por fim, a necessidade de pensar uma racionalidade ética que oriente o agir humano no mundo contemporâneo. (shrink)

Almost all contemporary philosophers on the subject agree that emotions play an indispensable role in the justification (as opposed to the mere causation) of other mental states and actions. However, how this role is to be understood is still an open question. At the core of the debate is the phenomenon of conflict without contradiction: why is it that an emotion need not be revised in the light of better judgment and knowledge? Conflict without contradiction has been explained either by (...) difference in content between emotion and judgment, or by a difference in the respective attitude towards content. I argue that conflict without contradiction is due to both differences, where difference in content is prior to difference in attitude. (shrink)

The disclosure of corporate environmental performance is an increasingly important element of a firm’s ethical behavior. We analyze how the legal origin of foreign institutional investors affects a firm’s voluntary greenhouse gas emissions disclosure. Using a large sample of firms from 36 countries, we show that foreign institutional ownership from civil law countries improves the scope and quality of a firm’s greenhouse gas emissions reporting. This relation is robust to addressing endogeneity and selection biases. The effect is more pronounced in (...) firms from non-climate-sensitized countries, for which the gap between firms’ environmental standards and investors’ environmental targets is potentially larger, and in less international firms. Firms with a higher level of voluntary greenhouse gas emissions disclosure also exhibit higher valuations. (shrink)

Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...) and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly. (shrink)

There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.

Homo Juridicus focuses on the normative foundations underlying all socio-cultural formations. The book uses the concept of ''normativity'' in an inclusive sense. It includes law, but it is not limited to it. As such, it explores the various social and cultural forces that persuade, incite, seduce, influence, direct, restrain, repress or control behavior. It is a major interdisciplinary study cutting across several disciplines of social science, such as law, anthropology, sociology, psychology, linguistics and philosophy. Its primary audience is law students, (...) as well as the scholarly community across law and the social sciences. ''Isaak Dore is one of the very few scholars who straddles a broad range of legal and nonlegal disciplines. This important book deconstructs the idea of normativity in culture and illuminates it through various strains of thought in anthropology, sociology, psychology, linguistics and philosophy. Its grasp of these disciplines is impressive in terms of nuance, breadth, particularity and lucidity. It is a unique work, brilliantly executed, providing a rich background against which the promotion of social order through legal and nonlegal norms can be evaluated. It both provokes and compels one to think outside of the conventional structures and assumptions of law and social order. I know of no other work that offers the broad intellectual reach that this ambitious book presents.'' - Laura S. Underkuffler, J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. (shrink)

In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality. One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from (...) this stronger claim. (shrink)

Wenn es um „den Kapitalismus“ geht, regieren schnell die Gefühle. Die Philosophen Sabine Döring und Lars Neth appellieren an die Vernunft. -/- Interview: Wolf Lotter.

Tendo como recorte certa produção da intelligentsia brasileira, a obra analisa a recepção da filosofia nietzschiana no período de 1922 a 1945, trazendo à luz um aspecto para o qual poucos pesquisadores atentam. Na literatura, modernistas como Mário de Andrade e Manuel Bandeira, e no registro ensaístico- sociológico, sobretudo Paulo Prado, Gilberto Freyre e Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, teriam recorrido ao pensamento de Nietzsche, em maior ou menor escala, nas suas produções.

Resumo: Tendo em conta que 2020 foi o ano de celebração do centenário de nascimento de Celso Furtado, como singela homenagem, neste artigo procuramos oferecer uma introdução preliminar sobre a recepção da filosofia de Nietzsche na obra do economista brasileiro. Celso Furtado é um dos pensadores mais influentes no campo da economia-política na América Latina. Mas ninguém ainda pesquisou a dimensão filosófica de seu pensamento. Não obstante, é possível discorrer que ele pensou a economia sob um ponto de vista crítico-filosófico. (...) Para comprovar essa hipótese, pretendemos evidenciar três aspectos conceituais por ele apropriados da filosofia de Nietzsche. São eles: a criatividade e/ou criação, para pensar o seu papel como agente motor de desenvolvimento da civilização industrial; a transvaloração de todos os valores, para pensar a relevância dos valores morais para os centros de decisões dos meios e dos fins da produção e distribuição do capital; e o perspectivismo, para pensar a economia como uma totalidade composta por múltiplas perspectivas estruturais.: Taking into account that 2020 was the year of celebration of the centenary of Celso Furtado's birth, as a simple tribute, in this article we seek to offer a preliminary introduction on the reception of Nietzsche's philosophy in the work of the Brazilian economist. Celso Furtado is one of the most influential thinkers in the field of political economy in Latin America. But no one has yet researched his philosophical dimension of thought. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that he thought economics from a critical-philosophical point of view. To prove this hypothesis, we intend to highlight three conceptual aspects that he appropriated from Nietzsche's philosophy. They are: creativity and / or creation, to think about its role as a driving agent for the development of industrial civilization; the transvalue of all values, to think about the relevance of moral values to the decision-making centers of the means and ends of capital production and distribution; and perspectivism, to think of the economy as a totality composed of multiple structural perspectives. (shrink)

In December 2019, 18 years after the outbreak of SARS, a new SARS-like virus began to circulate and rapidly spread in the People's R...

O trabalho é um exercício de pensamento referente ao lugar da filosofia no currículo do ensino médio. A investigação considera a recente presença da filosofia como disciplina obrigatória em todas as séries da escola média brasileira. Assim, a condição curricular, e o próprio lugar do docente são ainda uma lacuna a ser preenchida. Para essa “atividade” as provocações de Hannah Arendt e de Gilles Deleuze figuram como o solo conceitual da reflexão.O exercício intelectual de Arendt sobre o “vazio de pensamento” (...) e sua rigorosa análise sobre a faculdade de pensar articuladas com as provocações de Deleuze quanto a compreensão da filosofia como uma “produtora” e articuladora de conceitos, ditaram o caminho que sugere ser a filosofia, enquanto “disciplina”, um parar para pensar como forma de contrapor o pensar ao fluxo laboral de consumo de conteúdos da escola média. Aqui a filosofia enquanto disciplina é uma contemplação tão ativa quanto a ação. (shrink)

The arendtian research, with its “sui generis” style of topicing the politcs and pointing out political’s perplexities, it require our eyes one perception its researcheness logical. We are calling this logical as “tension”, it’s one hermeneutic conception which helps us in the comprehension of his work’s political reasonableness. It has been presented in its many political approaches.

A necessidade de homens e mulheres de fé esclarecida e bem fundamentada na política tornou-se preponderante na contemporaneidade. Vive-se em um contexto em que muitos perderam a esperança e não acreditam mais na política. Na perspectiva cristã, a fé se traduz na prática do amor e é alimentada pela esperança. Não é possível sonhar com uma qualidade de vida melhor, em âmbito pessoal e coletivo, se não houver pessoas de fé na política, imbuídas dessa missão. O Movimento Nacional Fé e (...) Política – MF&P, criado em 1989, e constituído por grupos de pessoas atuantes em comunidades eclesiais, movimentos populares, partidos políticos, sindicatos e outros espaços de organização social, surgiu para promover estratégias em favor da justiça social e da dignidade humana. O trabalho é feito através da reflexão, da celebração, do aprofundamento e estudo, em grupos, seminários, retiros e encontros, tendo como lema principal, atualmente, a Cultura do Bem-Viver. O objetivo deste trabalho, a partir do material bibliográfico do MF&P e de outros pesquisadores, foi analisar o contexto do nascimento e o desenvolvimento do MF&P no Brasil. Para isso, identificou a produção editorial e o histórico dos encontros e seminários, das fases do movimento, chegando à época atual, quando, a partir de 2011, o movimento incluiu a Cultura do Bem-Viver como novo horizonte ético e político. A metodologia utilizada foi a revisão de literatura e análise do material publicado de forma impressa e também na forma digital, no site do movimento, e em publicações de membros que fazem parte do MF&P. Pode-se concluir que, através de sua história, das publicações e dos encontros regionais e nacionais, o movimento abriu perspectivas sobre novas formas de se fazer política, que contemplam e reforçam a atenção para com a ética, o cuidado, a dignidade e a justiça social. É um movimento dinâmico que contribui como um caminho para uma nova sociedade que possa usufruir de seus direitos fundamentais. (shrink)

Soon it may be possible to promote the rehabilitation of criminal offenders through _neurointerventions_ (interventions which exert direct physical, chemical or biological effects on the brain). Some jurisdictions already utilise neurointerventions to diminish the risk of sexual or drug-related reoffending. And investigation is underway into several other neurointerventions that might also have rehabilitative applications within criminal justice—for example, pharmacotherapy to reduce aggression or impulsivity. Ethical debate on the use of neurointerventions to facilitate rehabilitation—henceforth ‘neurorehabilitation’—has proceeded on two assumptions: that we (...) have instrumental reasons for employing neurorehabilitation (e.g. because it helps protect the public from crime); and that its permissibility depends upon whether its use unjustifiably infringes offenders’ rights. This paper defends a different, hitherto neglected thought. I argue we have rights-based reasons to offer neurorehabilitation to offenders—in other words, that offenders have a _moral right_ to neurorehabilitation. I identify three considerations which support a moral right to conventional rehabilitative interventions—(1) as a countermeasure to the debilitating side-effects of punishment; (2) as a derivative right of the right to hope for renewed liberty; and (3) as compensation for structural injustice. I argue these considerations extend to support a moral right to neurorehabilitation in the following instance: when neurorehabilitation would be part of the _most effective_ package for facilitating rehabilitation, and can be carried out at reasonable cost. I then defend my argument against potential objections, including the objection that neurorehabilitation is a bad option for offenders to have and the charge of over-medicalisation. (shrink)

I argue that, in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion, one does not violate a rational requirement of any sort. Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence. Accordingly, my argument is that there is nothing incoherent in any way about experiencing a recalcitrant emotion. One becomes incoherent only if one allows the emotion to influence one's reasoning and/or action, in which case one violates the ‘consistency principle’ and/or the ‘enkratic principle’. From the standpoint of rationality, (...) it would even be counterproductive to put subjects under the obligation that their emotional experiences and their evaluative judgements must always fit together. When we nevertheless intuitively sense that the subject is irrational in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion this is in cases in which the emotion challenges the subject's agential identity. However, emotions can, but need not, challenge one's agential identity, and, furthermore, perceptions can do so as well. In any case, challenges of this kind do not involve the violation of a rational requirement. (shrink)

I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...) can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non-inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)

Based on its prevalence, there is an urgent need to better understand the mechanisms, opportunities and risks of sexual interaction in digital contexts that are related with sexual arousal. While there is a growing body of literature on SIDC, there is also a lack of conceptual clarity and classification. Therefore, based on a conceptual analysis, we propose to distinguish between sexual interaction through, via, and with digital technologies. Sexual interactions through digital technologies are face-to-face sexual interactions that have been started (...) digitally or are accompanied by digital technology. Sexual interactions via digital technology are technology-mediated interpersonal sexual interactions. Sexual interactions with digital technology occur when the technology itself has the role of an interaction partner. The three types of SIDC and their respective subtypes are explained and backed up with empirical studies that are grouped according to two major mediators: consent and commerce. Regarding the causes and consequences of the three types of SIDC we suggest a classification that entails biological, psychological, social, economic, and technological factors. Regarding implications of SIDC we suggest to focus on both opportunities and risks for sexual health. The proposed conceptual framework of SIDC is meant to inform future research. (shrink)

The question is why it is that objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. Answering this question requires an analysis of the nature of fear in the public sphere since feeling safe means to feel that one avoids the frightening, i.e. the threats or dangers that one perceives in the world. Döring argues that the fact-resistance fear might display in the public sphere is due to the characteristic function that fear fulfills in this sphere. In the (...) public sphere, fear is typically embodied by “fear narratives,” i.e. by real-life structuring stories of local groups which thereby respond to feelings of powerless fear and insecurity. By specifying what the threat is and how to deal with it in the right way, fear narratives reduce felt insecurity. Because of this and by thus enabling a feeling of superiority which may even turn the fear narrative into a narrative of enthusiastic heroism, fear in the public sphere does itself satisfy subjective preferences. This is why objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. The question is how we could and should handle this. (shrink)

Many theodicists have maintained that God is justified in permitting suffering on the ground that His doing so is a necessary condition of the realization of certain intrinsically valuable ends which the suffering serves and whose value outweighs the suffering which occasions them. Examples of ends which are frequently cited in this connection are freely chosen actions in accordance with stringent obligations to be charitable and steadfast. To say that the value of these ends outweighs the suffering which gives rise (...) to them is to say that the existence both of these ends and of suffering is better than the non-existence of both. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo visa apresentar, sistematizar e analisar, à luz da teoria social crítica, as ações desenvolvidas pelo NESEF (Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre o Ensino de Filosofia) ao longo de duas décadas de existência na Universidade Federal do Paraná - UFPR. Procura situar e referenciar as diferentes atividades desenvolvidas coletivamente no campo da pesquisa e da extensão. Parte do entendimento que a Filosofia só é Filosofia à medida que ela se nega e, por conseguinte, se realiza; e (...) ela só se realiza na prática social, cultural e política na e através da ação coletiva. Pretende mostrar o conjunto de ações desenvolvidas (em rede) pelo NESEF que, com o passar do tempo, assume a condição de “intelectual orgânico-coletivo”. Por se tratar de uma descrição de atividades estreitamente ligadas à atuação do autor, o texto revelará sua trajetória profissional entrelaçada ao seu “jeito de caminhar” diante dos embates teórico-práticos do campo acadêmico formando, assim, um contínuo movimento de ondas tensas (laços e nós) que encontraram na ação conjunta – na práxis coletiva – um terreno fértil. Palavras-chave: NESEF; Intelectual Orgânico; Educação Filosófica The NESEF as an organic-collective intellectual: from head to toe Abstract: This article aims to present, systematize and analyze, in the light of critical social theory, the actions developed by NESEF (Center for Studies and Research on Philosophy Teaching) over two decades at the Federal University of Paraná – UFPR. It seeks to point out and reference the different activities developed collectively in the field of research and extension. It is considered that Philosophy is Philosophy only insofar as it negates itself and, consequently, realizes itself; and it is only realized in social, cultural and political practice in and through collective action. It is intended to show the set of actions developed (in a network) by the NESEF which, over time, assumes the condition of “organic-collective intellectual”. As it is a description of activities closely linked to the author's work, the text reveals his professional trajectory intertwined with his "way of walking" in the face of theoretical-practical clashes in the academic field, thus forming a continuous movement of tense waves (ties and knots) that found fertile ground in joint action – in collective praxis. Key words: NESEF; Organic Intellectual; Philosophical Education Le NESEF comme intellectuel organique-collectif : de la tête aux pieds Résumé: Cet article vise à présenter, systématiser et analyser, à la lumière de la théorie sociale critique, les actions développées par le NESEF (Centre d'Études et de Recherche sur l'Enseignement de la Philosophie) pendant deux décennies à l'Université Fédérale du Paraná – UFPR. Il cherche à situer et référencer les différentes activités développées collectivement dans le domaine de la recherche et de l'extension. Il est entendu que la Philosophie n'est la Philosophie qu'en tant qu'elle se nie elle-même et, par conséquent, se réalise; et elle ne se réalise que dans la pratique sociale, culturelle et politique dans et par l'action collective. Il vise à montrer l'ensemble des actions développées (en réseau) par la NESEF qui, au fil du temps, assume la condition d'« intellectuel organique-collectif ». Comme il s'agit d'une description d'activités étroitement liées au cours de travail de l'auteur, le texte révèle sa trajectoire professionnelle entrelacé à sa "façon de marcher" face aux affrontements théoriques-pratiques du champ académique, formant ainsi un mouvement continu d'ondes tendues (liens et nœuds) qui ont trouvé un terreau fertile dans l'action commune – c'est à dire, dans la praxis collective. Mots clés: NESEF; Intellectuel Organique; Éducation Philosophique Data de registro: 23/01/2023 Data de aceite: 18/10/2023. (shrink)

Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. x + 212 pp.

Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence (...) should be assimilated. (shrink)